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This essay works towards a rough explication of the ontic-ontologi-
cal difference as it emerges in the early chapters of Heidegger’s Be-
ing and Time. It then goes on to use that difference to open up a pos-
sible ontology of culture. If the cultural disciplines are both
ontically oriented and cannot “see” the ontic–ontological differ-
ence—and Heidegger tells us this in so many words—what alterna-
tive version of culture becomes available to an ontologically-ori-
ented investigation that is aware of the difference?
I. Two kinds of being
Among many other things, Division I of Martin Heidegger’s
Being and Time is a map of the kinds of beings that there are.1 If
we can, for the sake of this investigation, assume the map to be
exhaustive, if not a complete fleshing-out of each kind of being,
then we should be able to use it to say something about the kind
of being that any given being is. And there is no reason why this
should not include culture or, indeed, the related kinds of be-
ings we sometimes call “cultures” and “cultural objects.” I be-
lieve it necessary to begin to say such things about culture, cul-
tures and cultural objects because, while there are countless extant
definitions of culture, as well as manifold lay and professional
theories and understandings of what culture is and cultures are,
1 I refer throughout to Joan Stambaugh’s translation of Being and Time (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1996). This edition also marks the
pagination of the original German edition. Hence references in brackets are to
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I know of no strictly ontological investigation in this field. Here I
am using “ontological” in Heidegger’s sense—a sense that will
be more fully elaborated as we proceed.
At the start of Being and Time, and although things become
more complex as that work proceeds, Heidegger makes a primor-
dial distinction between two kinds of beings. He distinguishes
between (α ) beings that are Da-sein (or sometimes “like Da-sein”)
and (β ) beings that are not Da-sein (or sometimes “unlike Da-
sein”). The first kind is made up of all beings that, in their be-
ing, are concerned about their being. Da-sein is any being that,
in Heidegger’s fundamentally non-psychologistic and non-cog-
nitive sense, understands its being, in its very being, as what it is
itself. In this respect, Da-sein does not have concrete attributes
(as do beings of the second β –kind); instead, “[a]s a being, Da-
sein always defines itself in terms of a possibility which it is and
somehow understands in its being” (41e/43g). An example would
be me, myself: “The being which this being is concerned about
in its being is always my own” (40e/42g); but Da-sein can also
be thought of as us, ourselves: “the beings that we ourselves are”
(43e/46g). Hence the familiar singular-plural distinction does not
apply when it comes to the ontological investigation of Da-sein,
but neither do the ordinary (empirical, ontic) expressions “‘life’
and ‘human being’” (43e/46g), as we shall see.
Along the same lines, because all knowing and representing
are formed, as it were, after the fact, on the ground of my being
Da-sein, I do not have, as Da-sein, the status of a “subject” who
merely knows or has representations of the brute reality of “ob-
jects”: “subject and object are not the same as Da-sein and world”
(56e/60g). In fact, the comparison is so dangerously misleading
that Heidegger’s marginal note reads: “Certainly not. So little that
even rejecting this by putting them together is already fatal” (56e,
note). The appellation “Da-sein” is not subjectivist, cognitive or
representationalist, then, but ontological. In fact, among
Heidegger’s reasons for the use of the term “Da-sein” is the
project of warding off what we can call the “representationalist
picture” of subject-object relations. To say that a being is Da-sein
(literally, there-being) is simply to say that its ontological condi-
tion is that it is concerned with its own being. Or it is to say that
“Da-sein is a being which is related understandingly in its being
towards that being” (49e/53g). This is why it is not right to say
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that Da-sein is co-terminous with “human being” or “life,” and
still less with “a human being” or “a life”; it is closer to the point
to say that Da-sein is any being of the same ontological kind as,
for example, human being.
By contrast, beings that are not Da-sein (β ) are such that they
are not, in themselves, as part of their very being, concerned with
that being. All the phenomena that we usually associate with “na-
ture” would be of this kind: atoms, trees, stars, human bodies,
and so on—though the Heideggerian jury may still be out on dol-
phins. And given that Heidegger’s own short list is “table, house,
tree” (40e/42g), we must assume that even things produced by
human hand can have this status (though, as we shall see, they
need not). Professional access to this sort of being is routinely via
the sciences or, more strictly, what Heidegger calls the “ontic”
sciences because these disciplines are pre-phenomenological and
hold that their respective objects-of-study have existent qualities
that can be accessed cognitively as “properties” of them. In terms
we have already encountered, ontic inquiries are those which as-
sume a subject-object relation as given and which therefore es-
tablish human investigators as “subjects” inquiring into the prop-
erties of objectively present objects. For Heidegger, there is
nothing wrong with such inquiries—he particularly mentions
anthropology, psychology and biology—it is simply that their ini-
tial assumptions will necessarily be other than ontological. That
is, these sciences will not be concerned with beings in their be-
ing (the ontological) but with beings as merely present objects-
for-a-subject (the ontic):
In suggesting that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to
give an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the
question of the kind of being of this being that we ourselves are, no
judgment is being made about the positive work of these disci-
plines. But, on the other hand, we must continually be conscious of
the fact that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed
by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material. Rather,
they are always already “there” even when that empirical material
is only collected. The fact that positivistic investigation does not see
these foundations and considers them to be self-evident is no proof
of the fact that they do not lie at the basis and are problematic in a
more radical sense than any thesis of positivistic science can ever
be. (46-47e/50g)
As opposed to this “positivistic” method of analysis founded on
“subjective” cognition of “objective” entities, Heidegger argues
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that beings that are Da-sein can only be accessed by a fundamental
phenomenological ontology (the “existential analytic”). This dis-
tinction arises from his noted ontic-ontological difference which we
have relied on already but can now formulate as: the difference be-
tween being (as such and in general) and merely present beings.
While beings that are not Da-sein can be accessed either ontically
(via the sciences) or ontologically, only a fundamental phenomeno-
logical ontology is appropriate to the existential analysis of Da-sein
by virtue of its not being a simple objective presence in the first
place. And if Da-sein is not a simple objective presence to start
with, fundamentally (as stars and trees may be), it therefore brings
to the fore the central question of the determination of the very
structure of being itself. (Hence the point of starting a general and
structural investigation of being with Da-sein and not some other
being.)
That-which-is-not-Da-sein (β ) has a number of distinct onto-
logical characteristics. Such beings are “categorial”; they belong
to categories “larger” than themselves and may have sub-catego-
ries “below” or “within” them. By contrast that-which-is-Da-sein
(α ) is non-categorial, hence existential. Categorials, moreover,
have their being merely within space, what Heidegger calls
“insideness.” They can be “next to” each other in space, but they
cannot touch in the sense of “encounter” (52e/55g). Existentials,
contrastively, are characterised by their being-in, their existen-
tial spatiality, their capacity to encounter such-and-such in the
world. Categorial space, “insideness,” can be measured with in-
struments and statistically represented, while existential spati-
ality is a more complex phenomenon of Da-sein’s being related
to its capacity to “de-distance” what it encounters in its world in
several complex ways. Hence the primary existential of being-in-
the-world pertains to Da-sein, as does the very notion of world
itself. Categorials, by contrast (and in contradistinction to any
version of “realism”), are strictly “worldless” (52e/55g). In be-
ing-in-the-world, then, Da-sein is not worldless but worldly. And
if that-which-is-not-Da-sein is, in itself, worldless, as it is encoun-
tered by Da-sein, it therefore “belongs” to the world and can then
be said to be “innerworldly” with respect to Da-sein. So: “termi-
nologically ‘worldly’ means a kind of being of Da-sein, never a
kind of being of something objectively present ‘in’ the world. We
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shall call this latter something belonging to the world, or
innerworldly” (61e/65g).
The two kinds of beings we have encountered so far, then,
are quite distinct. Beings that are not Da-sein have the distinc-
tive kind of presence called “objective presence”—Vorhandenheit.
They are Vorhandene: beings of mere factuality. Da-sein, on the
other hand, has facticity, an active but non-cognitive and non-
psychological principle of interestedness (or the possibility of
interestedness) in its own being. But as against “objective pres-
ence” (Vorhandenheit), we cannot and must not say that Da-sein
has mere “subjective presence,” precisely because its ontological
status, as we have seen, is other than and prior to the “represen-
tationalist picture” of mere subject–object relations. What are we
to say instead of this? What is the correct term to contrast with
the “objective presence” of beings that are not Da-sein?
We can see the importance of this question by drawing a sum-
mary table of the distinctions derived so far from the first two
chapters of Being and Time:
II. Equipmentality
Strictly—and this will bring us soon enough to the question
of culture’s ontological status—we should say that just as beings
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that are not Da-sein have the kind of presence that is objective
presence, so Da-sein has sheer being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-
world, and all of the further existentials that it implies and re-
quires, would be the strict opposite of Vorhandenheit. But
Heidegger does not say this in so many words. What he does
say instead is of primary relevance to our inquiry vis-à-vis cul-
ture.
At least as far as Division I of Being and Time is concerned,
the primordial existential determination of Da-sein as being-in-
the-world is its taking care. And primarily this means taking care
of, handling and otherwise using tools or equipment—at least this
is Heidegger’s first instance of taking care, sequentially in the
text (63-68e/67-73g). This is so central to Heidegger’s analytic
that he even includes “privative” instances or breaches of
equipmental use among the first cases of taking care:
Modes of taking care belong to the everydayness of being-in-the-
world, modes which let the being taken care of be encountered in
such a way that the worldly quality of innerworldly beings ap-
pears. Beings nearest at hand can be met up with in taking care of
things as unusable, as improperly adapted for their specific use.
Tools turn out to be damaged, their material unsuitable. In any
case, a useful thing of some sort is at hand here. (68e/70g; first ital-
ics mine.)
Accordingly, another kind—potentially a third kind—of being is ef-
fectively introduced into the picture, but one closely related to the
primordial existential of Da-sein. This kind of being is “the being
taken care of “; and, at least initially, this means the equipment that
Da-sein has ready-to-hand, whether fully functional or, just as im-
portantly, not.2  This third kind of being Heidegger calls
Zuhandenheit, readiness-to-hand, handiness, and beings of this sort
are accordingly referred to as Zuhandene. So, while we have, effec-
tively, a third ontological category, we can also see that, in another
sense, Zuhandene also form a distinctive contrast with Vorhandene—
objectively present beings.3
If, earlier, we might have been tempted to ask a question such
as “Is culture Da-sein or not-Da-sein?” we now have a third al-
2 This “not” shows that Heidegger’s stress on equipment is by no means
an endorsement of functionalism or utilitarianism.
3 For an account of Being and Time that begins with, and assumes through-
out, a threefold categorisation of being, see Robert Brandom, “Heidegger’s Cat-
egories in Being and Time,” The Monist vol. 66, no. 3, 1983: 387-409.
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ternative. And, moreover, I believe this third alternative can bring
us closer to the correct analysis of culture’s ontological status.
Can culture be the domain of being of Zuhandene? Is culture
Zuhandenheit? In order to answer this question, we need to back-
track to some of our earlier distinctions.
In Chapter 2, Heidegger describes, as we have mentioned, the
distinction between the mere factuality (Tatsächlichkeit) of the ob-
jectively present and the facticity (Faktizität) that is among the
ontological determinations of Da-sein itself (52e/56g). The former
refers only to beings that have objective presence (Vorhandenheit).
Hence beings that are Da-sein, by contrast, are correctly referred
to as having facticity rather than mere factuality. And this dif-
ference involves Da-sein’s encounters with other beings—contras-
tively with mere objects’ relations with one another (for example
their being next to one another in space): “The concept of facticity
implies that an ‘innerworldly’ being has being-in-the-world in
such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘des-
tiny’ with the being of those beings which it encounters within
its own world” (52e/56g; my italics).
For all this, and despite the intimate “worldly” encounters be-
tween Da-sein and other beings (such as its own equipment), the
characteristic of handiness (Zuhandenheit) does not strictly apply
to Da-sein itself, as such. Rather Zuhandenheit is a determination
only of our third kind of being: wares, equipment, tools, useful
things.
The ontology of Zuhandene is further discussed in Chapter 3,
but always in relation to what might be called Da-sein’s
equipmental understanding of the world. If understanding is al-
ways understanding-as, it is primordially understanding-as-
equipment. So, returning to the question posed at the end of the
previous section, in the strict sense, where Da-sein is concerned,
there is no utterly appropriate oppositional term for “objective
presence” (and, absolutely, “subjective presence” will not do, as
we have seen), unless it is the whole of being-in-the-world itself.
We cannot simply write “Zuhandenheit,” that is, in the cell of the
table opposite “Vorhandenheit.” This would be a basic error. How-
ever, we have established something like a deep (even a funda-
mental) affiliation between Da-sein and its equipment. Equipment
consists of the nearest things to hand for Da-sein; it is the being
other than itself with which it is primarily and most intimately
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associated and which it first encounters in and as its own facticity.
In Chapter 3, it becomes evident that the very understanding of
itself that Da-sein has (and by virtue of which, we will remem-
ber, it was initially made distinct from mere Vorhandene) is not
only non-psychological, non-cognitive, non-subjectivist and so on,
it is fundamentally equipmental.4 Understanding according to the
existential analytic is Da-sein’s capacity for the use of equipment
as its (ontologically) primordial mode of encountering (other)
beings in its world. So one possible picture of the overall two-
fold (or now, perhaps, threefold) ontological map would be as
follows:
s g n i e b s s e l d l r o w [ h c u s s a s g n i e b y l d l r o w
e n e d n a h r o V ]
s g n i e b y l d l r o w r e n n i o t t c e p s e r h t i w n i e s - a D . . .
e n e d n a h u Z ) e n e d n a h r o V ( 5
But this is by no means sufficient to make equipment “like” Da-
sein. This is most clear in Chapter 3 where Heidegger lists three
distinct but related kinds of being:
1. The being of the innerworldly beings initially encountered
(handiness);
2. The being of beings (objective presence) that is found and
4 Here we might be tempted by the slogan “Not mental but equipmental.”
5 The round brackets around the second “Vorhandene” make the term dis-
tinct from its merely ontic analysis. Heidegger, in Chapter 3 and beyond, fre-
quently refers to “objective presence” as “innerworldly.” This is only possible
on an ontological analysis. The merely ontic analysis is shown in the diagram
by square brackets. “Objective presence,” accordingly, has distinct meanings
on each type of analysis. Ontically, Vorhandene are simply things-in-themselves.
Ontologically: “Handiness is the ontological categorial definition of beings as
they are ‘in themselves’” (67e/71g, italics deleted). Then “objective presence,
as a possible kind of being of things at hand, is still bound up with handiness”
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determined by discovering them in their own right in going
through beings initially encountered;
3. The being of the ontic condition of the possibility of dis-
covering innerworldly beings in general, the worldliness of
the world. (82e/88g; my italics in item 2.)
He then goes on to add: “This third kind of being is an existential
determination of being-in-the-world, that is, of Da-sein. The other
two concepts of being are categories and concern beings unlike Da-
sein” (82e/88g). For all their intimacy, then, Zuhandene, just like
Vorhandene, are ultimately categorial. Moreover, because of (a)
equipment’s centrality to Da-sein’s own understanding and (b) its
categorial status along with Vorhandene—and this is a radical de-
parture from the standard subject-object account—the “access,” as
it were, of Da-sein to objectively present beings is via (“in going
through”) its equipment, via its “innerworldly beings initially en-
countered.”6 So we now have a quite different difference from the
more basic Da-sein/not-Da-sein contrast that opens Being and Time.
This new difference pits Da-sein and “beings like Da-sein”
(existentials) against “beings unlike Da-sein” (categorials). In this
case, we get a slightly different arrangement of the ontological
map:7
            existential(s) categorial(s)
             Da-sein <—> Zuhandene  —> Vorhandene
I take “categorial,” as per the initial sketch-analysis above, to refer
to the view that Vorhandene (and now also Zuhandene) may be
categorised; that they may consist of sub-categories and belong to
categories greater than themselves; and that this is the properly
ontic (scientific) analysis of them. I take “existential” to refer to the
inappropriateness of such an ontic analysis with respect to Da-sein
which, accordingly, cannot be a merely existing property/quality/
6 The importance of this cannot be overstated. What Heidegger has man-
aged here is unique: it means that Da-sein’s understanding precedes and ulti-
mately determines “objective reality” without, at the same time, stooping to
relativism or idealism (let alone their constructionist hybrid).
7 The arrows in the second row refer to (firstly) Da-sein’s intimacy with
Zuhandene and (secondly) its “in going through” Zuhandene to “access” objec-
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attribute of anything (such as God, consciousness, a subject) and
nor can it have merely existing properties/qualities/attributes
(such as anthropological characteristics, universal traits or a “hu-
man nature”). Categorial beings are formally, functionally and
mathematically specifiable. This is not true of Da-sein.8
Logically then:
a. Zuhandene must be both innerworldly and categorial.
b. Vorhandene must be both worldless/innerworldly and
categorial.
c.  Da-sein must be both worldly and existential.
Zuhandene, then, would be the only initially proper objects of
cultural inquiry, as Da-sein is the only initially proper object of
philosophical ontology and Vorhandene the only initially proper
objects of natural scientific inquiry. The question is: is equipment,
then, properly subject to ontic or to ontological description—or
else to both?
If we remain in the domain of ontic investigation, along with
anthropology, sociology and so on, our proper object will be this
or that cultural object and its characteristics. Here, collections will
be made and classifications drawn up. Much useful data will be
assembled and reported on regarding useful things—thence be-
coming a useful thing in its own right. At least potentially, ev-
ery single useful object could be described, tabulated, counted
and so on. This would not be nothing.9 But, at the same time, if
Heidegger is right, it would always have to go on against an
unproblematised and unexplicated background of (for all we
would know, mistaken) assumptions about what culture is as
8 Instead Heidegger refers, throughout Division I, to its “modes.” His dis-
cussion of kategoreisthai as “addressing” things encountered is close to the start
of the text (42e/44g) and is crucial to the existential analytic of Division I. It,
and its connection to noein and logos, should, ideally, have further specifica-
tion before it is simply connected, as here, to the forms of categorisation of
common sense and the natural sciences.
9 And a recent series of personal and professional circumstances has led
me to conclude that the particular discipline called “cultural studies” is now
almost completely in the business of this kind of collection-work. See, for ex-
ample, the “information for authors” supplements to the European Journal of
Cultural Studies and the International Journal of Cultural Studies. No discipline,
so far as I know, including philosophy, has an interest in the being of culture
as such.
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such.10 This—the question of culture as such, as opposed to any
ethnography or “cultural studies”—would have to be an onto-
logical inquiry. Any such inquiry would ask about the very con-
ditions of possibility of something (anything that is so) being a
cultural object, being Zuhandene. And until this investigation is
undertaken—and for all that there are many “theories of cul-
ture”—the whole “field” of culture drifts like a rudderless ship.
III. Summary theses
In the space of this short article, I cannot hope even to begin
(let alone complete) the task I have just announced.11 Instead, I
want simply to offer some basic theses, derived from the above
reading of the earliest chapters of Being and Time, for the guid-
ance of the task. In Heideggerian terms, these are way-markers;
they plot stations along a path yet to be travelled.
1. Equipment, “innerworldly being initially encountered,”
Zuhandene: this is the proper domain and “object” (as in “the-
matic,” “problematic” or “object of study”) of specifically cul-
tural analysis. This is how we should, henceforth, read the ex-
pression “cultural objects”—which might accordingly be better
rendered as “cultural beings.” That is “cultural objects” are no
more objects than are, say, eclipses—perhaps even less so. They
are not so much hammers as “hammerings”; “not tools them-
selves, but the work” (65e/69g).
2. Culture-as-such is not simply a collection or assemblage
of such cultural beings. It is not even any imaginably complete
assemblage of such beings. Finding, positivistically, ontically, all
the categorial characteristics of every single equipmental being
ever: this could not let us into a fundamental analysis of culture
as such.
3. Instead, culture-as-such consists in the fundamental on-
10 Neglecting the “is as such” of culture means that cultural studies, for ex-
ample, does not deal with cultural beings in their handiness. Rather, it “just
look[s] at things ‘theoretically’” (65e/69g). So it is not as if cultural studies,
for all its empirical grounding, is “practical” and the ontology of culture “theo-
retical.” If anything, vice versa.
11 I have  a series of papers available on request that begin to scratch the
surface of this crucial task. They begin from the premise that it may be pos-
sible to find a conception of culture elsewhere than in what we have called
“the representationalist picture”; that is, elsewhere than the standard “subject-
object” arrangement of the field of “knowledge” and “understanding.”
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tological status of equipment (tools, wares, useful things). Any
inquiry in this field would have to begin with the following de-
terminations of the facticity of culture:
3.1 Equipment (Zuhandene) is in one respect simply
categorial—it can be ontically described, collected, counted,
“ethnographised,” and so forth. In this respect it can be
treated as having some of the sheer empirical characteristics of
merely objectively present beings (Vorhandene).
3.2 At the same time, and in another respect, equipment is
an innerworldly (but never a worldless) being. In this respect
it is unlike Vorhandene and requires, for its analysis, an ontological
investigation of its position in Da-sein’s fundamental under-
standing of its own being-in-the-world. How is it that Da-sein
understands, exactly, its equipmentality? And, in particular,
how does equipment function, for Da-sein, “in going through” it
to “the being of beings (objective presence)” (82e/88g)?
3.3 This intimate (indeed inviolable and always-already
in-place) attachment between Da-sein and equipment sug-
gests that culture-as-such might be reconfigured as Da-sein’s
ownmost equipmental understanding of its in-the-worldli-
ness. How can we defend the thesis that Da-sein is, was, and
will be, always-already equipmental? Is it possible to conceive
of a kind of being that understands its own being-in-the-
world, but without equipment?
3.4 Everything in this investigation so far points to a pos-
sible (though by no means established) correspondence be-
tween the concept of equipment and the concept of technology.12
4. The analysis of “cultures,” “specific cultures” or “a culture
in particular” can be given neither by the collection of particu-
lar equipments, nor by the investigation of Da-sein’s equip-
mentality (culture-as-such). Instead, we might hypothesise that
what is called “a culture” is formed out of the “totality of refer-
ences” of specific equipments (64-65e/69-70g). That is, no item
of equipment remains, for Da-sein’s understanding, unrelated or
irrelevant to others. Each references or points to the others. The
hammer, for example, is pointless without nails (or something
12 It may be possible for this to square with Heidegger’s account of the an-
cient and proper (but currently hidden) meaning of “technology” as techné. See
Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” trans. W. Lovitt, in
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else to be hammered). The hammer and the nails are pointless
without sawn timber (or something else to be nailed). All three
are pointless without the “in-order-to” of, say, building a house.
In this lies the possibility of thinking the being of culture in and
as a specific totality (or “manifold” [65e/69g]) of reference. The
work of building a house lies within the “referential context”
(66e/70g) of the “whereof of which it consists” (66e/70g): the
timber, the nails, the hammer. The work of hammering, likewise,
in the “what-for of its usability” (66e/70g): building the house.
4.1 Heidegger’s position on totalities, contexts or manifolds
of reference suggests support for Sacks’s idea that cultures dis-
play “order at all points.”13 Prior to Sacks, there are two stan-
dard accounts of cultural acquisition or “enculturation” (and
they can extend to or derive from models of language acquisi-
tion). The standard empiricist account views cultural acquisi-
tion as a developmental aggregation of experienced particu-
lars or “inputs.” The rationalist account treats it in terms of an
innate disposition towards ordering (regardless of experi-
enced particulars). Against both of these, Sacks’s “order at all
points” conjecture has it that cultural orders (totalities of refer-
ence) are wholly displayed in any of their fragments. As
Schegloff puts it in his introduction to the first volume of
Sacks’s Lectures:
An alternative to the possibility that order manifests itself at an
aggregate level and is statistical in character is what [Sacks]
terms the ‘order at all points’ view. . . . This view, rather like the
‘holographic’ model of information distribution, understands
order not to be present only at aggregate levels and therefore
subject to a overall differential distribution, but to be present in
detail on a case by case, environment by environment basis. A
culture is not then to be found only by aggregating all of its
venues; it is substantially present in each of its venues.14
5. The specification of the being of culture (its proper onto-
13 “Reference” and “context of reference” should not be confused with ref-
erential theories of, for example, meaning. The German terms Verweisung and
Verweisungszusammenhang do not permit this reading. This is the point of Sec-
tion 17 in Chapter 3 (71-77e/76-83g) which ends by telling us that “Reference
. . . constitutes handiness itself.” The English term “referral” may be more to
the point in expressing the “what-for” and “in-order-to” linkages between useful
things within a totality.
14 See Schegloff’s introduction to Harvey Sacks’s Lectures on Conversation,
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logical analysis) as equipmentality is, surprisingly enough per-
haps, possible without yet invoking the ideas of “interaction” (5.1)
or “society” (5.2).
5.1 Since equipment is what Da-sein first and primarily
encounters as a being-with it in the world, culture (in this
sense) precedes Dasein’s being-with-others (the Mit-dasein) in
relative immediacy (“de-distancing”) (110-118e/117-125g). By
this I mean that it has ontological primacy over what, ontically, is
often described as “interaction” or “the relation to others” (for
example, in social psychology and symbolic interactionism).15
5.2 Society-at-large lies even further from (is even less de-
distanced by) Da-sein and consists in the “they” (das Mann)
(118-122e/126-130g). This is the public domain where “idle
talk” (none of these terms is meant disparagingly) levels out
Da-sein’s understanding to a general picture of “what one
does.” By definition, then, equipmentality precedes it,
ontologically speaking. In this respect, it is a fundamental er-
ror to begin the analysis of culture from the premise that it is
first and essentially “social.” Instead, we should say that the
very possibility of the social (as the “they,” as the public or, in-
deed, as the others, the Mit-dasein) is grounded on the prior
being that Da-sein is—including its fundamental equip-
mentality. Ontologically, culture and society are quite distinct
(though they have their eventual connections in the “inau-
thentic” relation between Da-sein and the “they”) and it is a
fatal error to begin with their co-imbrication, let alone with the
subjection of culture to society.16 If culture is ontologically pre-
15 The ontological primacy of readiness-to-hand over the Mit-dasein is ex-
pressed by Heidegger as follows: “. . . the worldliness of the world thus con-
stituted in which Da-sein always already essentially is, lets things at hand be
encountered in the surrounding world in such a way that the Mit-dasein of others
is encountered at the same time with them as circumspectly taken care of. The
structure of the worldliness of the world is such that others are not initially
objectively present as unattached subjects along with other things, but show
themselves in their heedful being in the surrounding world in terms of the things
at hand in that world” (116e/123g).
16 The terms “authentic” and “inauthentic” are non-evaluative in
Heidegger’s ontological terminology. They should by no means be thought of
as implying a morality and, still less, as equating with the use of similar terms
by the Frankfurt School of social theorists. Hence: “inauthenticity can deter-
mine Da-sein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested,
and capable of pleasure” (40e/43g). The term “authentic” should be thought
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social and ontically pre-sociological, this does not mean that it
is egoism, solipsism, subjectivism or anything of the kind. On
the contrary, one of the main points of the existential analytic
of Da-sein is to show that it is not, in any sense, “an ego,” “a
mind” or “a subject” in the first place. This must apply, then,
to its fundamental existential determinations: including its
equipmentality.
6. There is nothing in the equation of “cultural objects” with
Zuhandene, and all that follows from it, to prevent living beings,
including persons and bodies, from being cultural beings. Da-
sein is not “man,” and “man” may be as much the handled as
the handler, as much (perhaps) the technology as the technolo-
gist.
7. We should not forget that Da-sein and Zuhandene are al-
ways already bound together. Each depends on the other, as it
were, reflexively. No account of one—including Heidegger’s ac-
count of time and death in Division II—is sufficient without the
other. In this respect, cultural inquiry and philosophical inquiry
cannot be so easily separated in terms of their “objects” of in-
quiry.17 Or, at least, both are crucially engaged in the analysis
and understanding of “world.” Ontologically, however, this is as
far from any anthropologistic concern with “forms of life” or
“whole ways of life” as it is possible to be.
8. Culture, analysed and specified ontologically, has a single
main advantage over ontic and derivational “theories of culture”
(for example, those that derive culture from ideas about nature,
economy, climate, topography, society, state, genius, spirit, world
picture and so on), over the “philosophy of culture” (156e/167g),
and over all necessarily positivistic accounts of specific cultural
“objects” (including ethnographies, participant observations, data
via “auto-” and/or “proprio-.” With Da-sein, it has to do with its ownmost be-
ing. In other respects (in)authenticity leads us to the important field of
(ap)propriation (Ereignis) in the later Heidegger. Further, we could read Being
and Time as an analysis of Da-sein’s “proprioception,” providing the physiologi-
cal connotations could somehow be removed from that term.
17 Heidegger’s remarks about culture, both in Being and Time and elsewhere,
are unfortunate in this respect. In a piece called “‘The Twisted Handiwork of
Egypt’ and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Culture” (available on request),
I have tried to rework some of these ideas by asking how Heidegger might
have gone about his task if he first thought that culture might (just conceiv-
ably), along with art, science and technology, have more than merely ontic status.
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collections, interviews and so on). Its advantage is that, unlike
all these others, it works with a radical requestioning of whether
everything that is is an object for a subject. That is, it works
against the dominant, orthodox (but, for this reason, barely even
mentioned) general picture of culture as being representational-
ist through and through. As Heidegger makes clear: Da-sein is
not a simple objective presence (such as a human body or a per-
son) with a representational capacity (consciousness, for example,
or the capacity for thought) tacked on afterwards. It is not as if
one simply placed an active circuit into an inert grey box. If this
is so, Da-sein’s equipmental being-with cannot be founded on
such representationalist premises. Until there is a fundamental
ontology of culture, then, none of the professional equipmental
practices that call themselves “the cultural sciences” or “the cul-
tural disciplines” can even begin to work on definite founda-
tions—if only because they do not yet know (and seem not to
want to know) what culture is.